BOUNTY DIAMONDS · 5 COLLAPSE SPECIMENS · SAYBOOK FILING PIPELINE

5 COLLAPSE SPECIMENS · PoC → Saybook Chapter → Filing

POC024

LayerZero lzCompose Reentrancy · L6×L0

① FILE NOW

Shape

Reentrancy Spiral · L6→L0 state corruption

Collapse layers

L6 (execution) × L0 (state) collapse

Attack geometry

1 call → 6 nested → depth 5 → corrupted state

Invariant violated

CEI · single-message execution model

WLS

75 · HIGH/CRITICAL candidate

Theorem

skip_verify_zombie_floor (CEI = verification skipped)

Filing thesis (lead with bite mark, not species)

"State corruption across reentrant lzCompose execution with reproducible call trace and invariant violation. A crafted lzCompose flow reenters before state finalization, producing six nested calls from a single attacker entry, reaching depth 5 and corrupting state."

SORRY-SCOPE-FRESHNESS: re-check LayerZero OApp group/version/chain before submit SORRY-VAR: 6 reentrant calls is the knife; quantify affected pool/message value SORRY-REPRODUCIBILITY: include exact commit, fork block, forge command, assertions

POC016

Morpho Oracle Staleness · L2 Watcher Floor

② CANTINA ROUTE

Shape

Stale Watcher Crescent · L2 watcher floor=0

Staleness

86,400 seconds · protocol treats stale = fresh

Gas

1.1M gas · MEDIUM candidate

Root cause

Missing watcher freshness floor

WLS

Medium · watcher trust failure

Theorem

watcher_signal_not_floor_restoration (stale = stale_truth_failure)

Filing thesis

"The protocol lacks a freshness floor and therefore cannot distinguish current truth from yesterday's corpse. A Morpho market processes oracle data that is 86,400 seconds stale without protocol-level freshness rejection."

SORRY-MORPHO-VENUE: current Morpho docs point to Cantina, not Immunefi — verify exact route SORRY-VAR: staleness window value-at-risk depends on price volatility during gap

POC005

Aave Oracle Manipulation · L2×L5 Regulator Fork

③ VERIFY AUTHORITY PATH

Shape

Regulator Fork · L2×L5 oracle authority replacement

Extraction

3,500 USDC in → ~$10,309 WETH out · 2.94×

Gas

820k gas · HIGH (if non-admin)

Critical gate

Admin-only → loaded gun in safe. Non-admin → loaded gun in vending machine.

Theorem

stale_truth_failure + watcher_signal_not_floor_restoration

WLS

Pending authority determination

Filing thesis (admin-only)

"Oracle source replacement produces 2.94× extractive mispricing. Severity conditioned on whether replacement path is restricted to trusted admin/governance or reachable through weaker authority."

SORRY-AAVE-AUTHORITY: [P0] determine admin-only vs non-admin path BEFORE filing severity claim SORRY-BLAST-RADIUS: 2.94× is PoC profit, not full VaR — quantify affected pools

MORPHO-PERM

MetaMorpho Permissionless Oracle · L2 Empty Floor Well

④ CLO FIRST

Shape

Empty Floor Well · L2 floor=0, no enforcement

Impact

10 ETH seized · victim keeps debt

Gas

398k gas

Legal goblin

Spearbit/audit may have acknowledged by-design. MetaMorpho curator trust = the angle.

Filing angle

MetaMorpho vault users inherit unsafe oracle via curator without enforcement/disclosure

Theorem

gbm_bevacizumab_paradox (curator present ≠ market safe)

Filing thesis (CLO-reviewed only)

"MetaMorpho vault users can inherit unsafe permissionless oracle assumptions through curator abstraction, causing collateral seizure and remaining debt in markets appearing curator-mediated."

SORRY-BY-DESIGN: permissionless oracle risk may be acknowledged — CLO read required SORRY-AUDIT-PRIOR-ART: Spearbit acknowledgment may constitute prior-art tombstone SORRY-CURATOR-TRUST: prove vault abstraction creates user trust vs explicit permissionless assumption

MAKER-OSM

MakerDAO OSM Delay Window · L2×L5 Delayed Page Curve

⑤ INFORMATIONAL

Shape

Delayed Page Curve · L2×L5 watcher latency

Window

1hr OSM blind + $141/ETH undercollateralized at 10% crash

Status

Known design · OSM delay is intentional

Value

Risk quantification: specific window, specific $ gap

Theorem

watcher_signal_not_floor_restoration (stale watcher = old truth)

Payout likely?

No — unless novel bypass found

Filing thesis (informational)

"Quantified OSM delay exploit window under 10% ETH crash creates $141/ETH undercollateralization gap. Known design risk with new quantified specificity. Not claiming novel bug — documenting known sharpness."

SORRY-BY-DESIGN: OSM delay is intentional Maker design — file as risk analysis, not bug SORRY-PAYOUT: known design + prior acknowledgment = unlikely payout without novel bypass

SAYBOOK CHAPTER TEMPLATE · 10 SECTIONS PER PoC

Chapter: [POC_ID] — [Protocol] [Attack Shape] §1 ONE-SENTENCE IMPACT "A crafted X can Y, enabling Z under a single-message execution model." §2 SCOPE + PROGRAM LINK Program: [exact Immunefi/Cantina/H1 URL, saved PDF at filing time] Asset: [contract address · chain · version · group] §3 AFFECTED CONTRACTS / FUNCTIONS Contract: [address] · Function: [name] · File: [path:line] §4 INVARIANT VIOLATED "Before: X cannot happen. After exploit: X happened." §5 POC STEPS forge test --fork-url [RPC] --fork-block [N] -vvvv --match-test [testName] §6 RUNTIME TRACE [call tree, depths, gas per call, return values] §7 STATE DELTA Before: [state vars]. After: [corrupted/changed state vars]. §8 VALUE-AT-RISK ESTIMATE Theoretical max: [TVL × %. Current TVL: $X. Realistic window: $Y.] §9 SUGGESTED FIX [ReentrancyGuard / freshness check / CEI reorder / invariant assertion] §10 SORRIES / ASSUMPTIONS / SCOPE NOTES SORRY-[id]: [what we don't know / scope disclaimer]