Sandra · TTC Infrastructure · Group F

← Synthesis Harvey Oliver Cochran Group F

I. Sandra's Read — The Triangle of Interests

There are three parties whose interests must be balanced on the SSE project: Aecon (Canadian, relationship-driven, union-familiar), FCC Canada (European, process-driven, capital-heavy), and Metrolinx/IO (public entity, politically accountable, risk-averse). STC as the JV sits in the middle. Every decision has to work for all three, or it eventually doesn't work for any of them.

Sandra's Framework — The Three Tests

Before making any significant decision on the project: (1) Does this work for the JV partners? (2) Does this work for the client? (3) Does this work for the project?

A decision that works for Aecon but not FCC creates JV friction that surfaces later. A decision that works for STC but not Metrolinx creates client disputes. A decision that works for everyone today but delays the project fails the third test. All three tests must pass.

II. JV Governance — Aecon + FCC Canada

JV governance disputes are a leading cause of project failure on large infrastructure projects. The JV agreement should address: decision-making thresholds (unanimous vs. majority vs. single-party authority), deadlock resolution mechanisms, liability allocation per scope package, and exit rights if a partner becomes unable to perform.

Scope packages: Assign clear primary responsibility for each package — stations, rail, systems. The JV partner with primary responsibility makes day-to-day decisions; major changes require JV board approval.
Financial decisions: Payments above a threshold (typically $500K on a project this size) require both partners to sign. Below threshold, single-partner authority.
Change orders: All change orders to the Project Agreement must be approved by both JV partners before submission to Metrolinx. No unilateral commitments.
Dispute resolution: JV partner disputes go to senior management escalation first (10 days), then expedited arbitration (30 days). Courts are the last resort — too slow for a live construction project.

III. The Client Relationship — Managing Metrolinx and IO

Metrolinx and Infrastructure Ontario are not a typical client. They are accountable to the Ontario Legislature and to the public. Every decision they make on SSE-SRS is subject to freedom of information requests, auditor general scrutiny, and political attention. They are risk-averse by institutional necessity.

Sandra's advice for managing the relationship: over-communicate, under-surprise. Give Metrolinx bad news early. Give them options, not just problems. Make it easy for them to say yes. And understand that their approval processes are slow not because they're obstructionist — it's because they have to be able to defend every decision in an Estimates Committee hearing.

IV. EOSE's Role in the Triangle

If EOSE fleet technology is deployed on the SSE project, EOSE enters the triangle as a fourth party — a subcontractor/technology partner whose interests must be managed. Sandra's recommendation: position EOSE as a collaborative partner, not a vendor. The IP schedule and data processing agreement are not adversarial documents — they are the governance framework that lets all parties move forward with confidence.