Workload identity must bind to sovereign GID before admission
⊕ GREYBACK YANG
All fleet workloads are GID-stamped at build time via the PEMCLAU CI pipeline. Identity binding is verified pre-pull by the ACR token chain.
⊖ TAZ INVERSION
External workloads pulled via third-party Helm charts bypass GID stamping. Admission controller does not yet reject unlabeled pods from public registries.
Pods admitted only to namespaces matching their GID sovereignty scope
⊕ GREYBACK YANG
pemos-system and pemos-agents namespaces are GID-scoped. RBAC ensures service accounts cannot cross namespace boundaries. Network policies enforce isolation.
⊖ TAZ INVERSION
kube-system pods are excluded from sovereignty scoping. System daemonsets (Datadog, Falco) run outside GID boundaries — exemptions not yet documented in MEROSTONE.
Only images from EOSE ACR or approved registries may be admitted
⊕ GREYBACK YANG
OPA ConstraintTemplate EA-69 defines allowedRegistries list. eosefleetacrdev.azurecr.io and mcr.microsoft.com on the list. Admission webhook enforces at pod creation.
⊖ TAZ INVERSION
Docker Hub still on allowlist for legacy tooling. External registries should be mirrored into ACR — not allowlisted. Sovereignty gap.